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Organisational Responses to Mandatory Modern Slavery Disclosure Legislation: A Failure 
of Experimentalist Governance? 
Purpose: This paper investigates how organisations are responding to mandatory modern 
slavery disclosure legislation. Experimentalist governance suggests that organisations faced 
with disclosure requirements such as those contained in the UK Modern Slavery Act 2015 
will compete with one another, and in doing so improve compliance. We seek to understand 
whether this is the case.
Methodology: Our study is set in the UK public sector. We conduct interviews with over 
25% of UK universities that are within the scope of the UK Modern Slavery Act 2015 and 
examine their reporting and disclosure under that legislation.
Findings: We find that, contrary to the logic of experimentalist governance, universities’ 
disclosures as reflected in their modern slavery statements are persistently poor on detail, 
lack variation, and have led to little meaningful action to tackle modern slavery. We show 
that this is due to a herding effect that results in universities responding as a sector rather 
than independently; a built-in incapacity to effectively manage supply chains; and 
insufficient attention to the issue at the board level. We also identity important boundary 
conditions of experimentalist governance.
Research limitations: The generalisability of our findings is restricted to the public sector.
Practical implications: In contexts where disclosure under the UK Modern Slavery Act 2015 is 
not a core offering of the sector, and where competition is limited, there is little incentive to 
engage in a ‘race to the top’ in terms of disclosure. As such, pro-forma compliance prevails 
and the effectiveness of disclosure as a tool to drive change in supply chains to safeguard 
workers is relatively ineffective. Instead, organisations must develop better knowledge of 
their supply chains and executives a more critical eye for modern slavery to be combatted 
effectively. Accountants and their systems and skills can facilitate this development.
Originality: This is the first investigation of the organisational processes and activities which 
underpin disclosures related to modern slavery disclosure legislation. This paper contributes 
to the accounting and disclosure modern slavery literature by investigating public sector 
organisations’ processes, activities and responses to mandatory reporting legislation on 
modern slavery.
Keywords: disclosure legislation; inter-organizational dynamics; intra-organizational 
practices; modern slavery; response to disclosure legislation; higher education; public sector
Paper type: Research paper
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2
Organisational Responses to Mandatory Modern Slavery Disclosure Legislation: A Failure 
of Experimentalist Governance? 
Introduction
Recognition of the persistence of extreme forms of labour exploitation in the sourcing of 
everyday products including chocolate, garments, and electronics has prompted increased 
attention to the problem of modern slavery in supply chains. Defined as “the exploitation of 
a person who is deprived of individual liberty anywhere along the supply chain, from raw 
material extraction to the final customer, for the purpose of service provision or 
production” (Gold et al., 2015: 487), modern slavery in the supply chain is a key issue for any 
organisation and has become a prominent area of focus for governments seeking to combat 
modern slavery in its various guises.  
In recent years, governments have introduced mandatory modern slavery disclosure 
legislation1 to tackle the problem of modern slavery in supply chains. Although the various 
manifestations of this ‘transparency in supply chains’ (TISC) legislation to date have been 
subjected to both praise and criticism (e.g. English, 2019; Prokopets, 2014), there has been 
relatively little empirical research examining the effectiveness of its underlying logic. The UK 
Modern Slavery Act 2015 (MSA) is a form of experimentalist governance, a mode of 
legislation aimed at using public oversight to govern private action by mandating that 
organisations regularly inform stakeholders of what they are doing and allowing consumers 
to judge their actions (Sabel and Zeitlin, 2012). This is done through a process in which a 
goal is set and those in scope encouraged to respond in their own way provided they 
comply with this goal. This initiates a process in which responses are compared by other 
respondents, enabling a cycle of improvement through peer review and adoption of best 
practice (Overdevest et al., 2010).
The experimentalist governance process is of particular interest to scholars of disclosure-
related issues for several reasons. First, it has become the mode through which supply chain 
anti-slavery legislation has largely been enacted. Second, the intended self-reinforcing 
feedback loop offers not only a temporal aspect – through annual reporting – but also a 
multiplying factor, by encouraging reporting to ‘cascade’ down the supply chain, with large 
organisations expected to leverage the legislation to encourage their suppliers to report on 
their own risks. Third, while some organisations have voluntarily disclosed information on 
human rights risks (e.g. Christ et al., 2019), the experimentalist governance form of modern 
slavery reporting requires disclosure on what is a largely under-researched area of 
organisations’ operations.
Analyses of responses by organisations to MSA have so far focused on providing metrics of 
(non-)compliance and content analysis of reports (e.g. Stevenson and Cole, 2018; Voss et al., 
2019). Consequently, there is little understanding of how organisations have engaged with 
1 This form of disclosure legislation is known to accounting scholars as follows (see example of environmental 
disclosure regulation in Cho et al. (2008): “[…] More specifically, this study examines how the chemical and 
petroleum industries, through their PAC contributions, appear to have intended to suppress the passage of a 
piece of legislation requiring the disclosure of environmental information.” (p. 451, our emphases) 
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MSA, or of the behavioural change that is necessary in order to follow the logic of 
experimentalist governance.
This is particularly true for public sector organisations (PSOs). The public sector was initially 
exempted from MSA. While this has subsequently changed, following a review of the 
legislation (Field MP et al., 2019), universities were deemed sufficiently commercial to fall 
within scope from the outset (Coultas, 2016). Analysis of higher education institutions’ 
(HEIs’) disclosures in response to MSA suggests that significant learning remains to be done 
in order to understand the impact of their activities on people in their supply chains 
(Martin-Ortega, 2016). There are several reasons unique to the public sector that might 
explain this, including the conflicting pressures for value and sustainability coming from the 
same stakeholders (O’Brien et al., 2018).
The literature suggests that there are doubts over HE’s capacity to undertake supply chain 
due diligence and that the sector lacks the competitive dynamics required by the cyclical 
reporting stipulations of MSA. We therefore pose the following research questions: How do 
UK universities respond to and engage with the experimentalist governance process 
represented by the UK Modern Slavery Act 2015? What are the barriers to engagement?
Based on interviews with key university personnel responsible for managing and reporting 
on modern slavery in supply chains in 33 UK universities our findings show that, contrary to 
the logic of experimentalist governance driving MSA, universities show little engagement 
beyond basic compliance. This is due to (1) a herding effect that results in universities 
responding as a sector rather than independently, removing the competitive element of 
performance improvement that the experimentalist governance relies upon; (2) a built-in 
incapacity to effectively manage supply chains; and (3) insufficient attention at the board 
level to the issue. 
In seeking a deeper understanding of organisational responses to MSA, this study 
contributes to several literatures. First, the paper adds to the nascent body of knowledge on 
modern slavery in the accounting and disclosure literature. While other disciplines have 
been investigating modern slavery for decades (Bales, 2000), accounting scholars have only 
recently begun to research the topic, leaving the discipline with a paucity of knowledge 
upon which to build. Specifically, we begin to understand the organisational level processes 
and practices that facilitate or hinder how public sector organisations react to disclosure 
legislation on modern slavery. Second, we add to accounting and public sector research 
where, despite significant interest in universities, little is known about their responses to 
modern slavery legislation (Martin-Ortega and Krupinska, 2018). We highlight the structural 
and leadership challenges faced by HEIs which have limited the value of their disclosures. 
Third, we establish empirically informed boundary conditions for experimentalist 
governance, the form of reflexive law (Deakin, 2009) upon which MSA is based. Third, 
Finally, the paper has managerial implications, as we highlight the problems of outsourcing 
and deskilling.
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Modern slavery
In the accounting literature, research on topics around forced labour appear rooted in a 
literature that views older forms of slavery through an accounting lens (e.g. Irvine, 2012; 
Sharma and Irvine, 2016; Tyson, et al., 2004). More recent studies in accounting which have 
focused on exploitation have been concerned with organisational responses to human 
rights (e.g. Frankental, 2011; Hazelton, 2013; O'Dwyer and Unerman, 2008). While a body of 
research around disclosure on human rights (e.g. Cooper et al., 2011; Islam and van Staden, 
2018;  McPhail and Ferguson, 2016; McPhail et al., 2016) has existed in the accounting 
literature for a decade, this research focuses on disclosures that are largely voluntary rather 
than, as with the MSA, being enshrined in law. 
In contrast to voluntary human rights disclosures, MSA is a legal obligation. MSA is a unique 
piece of legislation in that it mandates organisations, for the first time, to report on actions 
they are taking to protect individuals in their organisations and supply chains from modern 
slavery. In  requiring this disclosure, MSA aims to inspire focal organisations to encourage 
their supply chains to respond in an ethical way, particularly since the law is based on the 
logic that stakeholders will hold those focal organisations responsible for instances of 
modern slavery within them (Voss et al., 2019).
However, there are problems with this market-driven approach to the use of disclosure for 
delivering indirect openness. Michelon et al. (2020) offer evidence that pressure for 
increased disclosure does little to encourage change in organisational activities and, in fact, 
can damage genuine action as reporting becomes an organisational tool demonstrating 
compliance rather than driving change. In particular, instances of organised hypocrisy, 
where firms seek to reconcile disparate or contradictory stakeholder demands, and in doing 
so say one thing yet do another, abound (Cho et al., 2015). Boiral (2013), for example, finds 
that 90% of negative events in a sample of firms reporting against the Global Reporting 
Initiative (GRI) framework were not disclosed. Chauvey et al. (2015) conclude that this is 
potentially a problem of legitimacy, and add non-compliance as a firm response to demands 
for disclosure.
Studies of organisational responses to modern slavery disclosure legislation focus largely on 
the fashion, textiles, and apparel sectors, which are considered high-risk in terms of labour 
abuses (New, 2015). These articles demonstrate poor levels of compliance with the relevant 
legislation across the board. Ma et al. (2016) cite apparel firms within the scope of CTSCA as 
having compliance levels below 50%. Similarly low levels of engagement have been found in 
firms  reporting under MSA  (Voss et al., 2019), a failure which reflects poor detection 
practices and a homogeneity of policies that has prevented sufficient tailoring of 
approaches to the various contexts in which firms reviewed operate (Stevenson and Cole, 
2018). In an attempt to explain this failure, English (2019) concludes that MSA has turned 
concern for labour rights into an extension of corporate social responsibility (CSR) which, 
generally, is too superficial to combat modern slavery, a task requiring a greater 
engagement with, and depth of understanding of, supply chains. Christ et al. (2019) describe 
a similarly poor level of engagement among large Australian firms, albeit before the 
Australian Modern Slavery Act came into force.
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The wider management literature has both partial explanations of issues identified in the 
accounting research and new questions on modern slavery. First, there is a lack of 
understanding of what happens further down the supply chain, particularly since this is 
where much of the risk lies. Supply chains, by their nature, exceed the boundary of any one 
organisation (Crane et al. 2018). This is particularly important to note because the extremely 
complex nature of global supply chains (Stringer and Michailova, 2018) means the 
subcontracting of a lot of production in high-risk industries, and that this accumulates 
sourcing in areas of the world in which smaller firms will knowingly evade the law (Chesney 
et al., 2019; Soundararajan et al., 2018).
Secondly, it creates an assumption that the focal organisation can ultimately be held 
responsible when, as McGuire and Laaser (2018) highlight, there are national governments 
in some parts of the world – Uzbekistan’s cotton farming sector, for example - mandating 
forced labour. 
Thirdly, some large organisations may be at the mercy of established industry practices, 
leaving them exposed to modern slavery in their supply chains Pinheiro et al. (2019). 
Industries such as coffee (Thiruchelvam et al., 2018) and cocoa (LeBaron and Gore, 2019), 
both of which are considered high-risk areas for modern slavery, have structures and 
practices which make it hard for individual organisations that source from them to create 
the visibility necessary for change.
While this may be the case, there are examples in the literature of efforts by organisations 
to tackle modern slavery in their supply chains. These efforts take a number of forms, 
including organisations collaborating with smaller companies and retailers to build 
competitive advantage (Benstead et al., 2018), and using technologies such as blockchain 
(Rogerson and Parry, 2020) and worker feedback mechanisms to identify incidences (Taylor 
and Shih, 2019). Byerly et al. (2012) demonstrate that even sectors known to be high-risk – 
in this instance brick kilns – can be identified in unusual ways, finding that, such is the 
uniformity of these sites, they can be recognised using satellite imaging and algorithmic 
searches.
The complexities of these contexts have led not only to a dislocated assortment of 
obligations, but, ultimately, a failure to deliver information to consumers (Christ and Burritt, 
2018). Looking generally at the legislative landscape, Nolan and Bott (2018) observe a lack 
of due diligence, of detail in disclosure, of the use of other stakeholders’ leverage and 
knowledge, and, perhaps most vitally of all, of regulatory consequences. Prokopets (2014) 
highlights this lack of enforcement in particular as a factor in the California Transparency in 
Supply Chains Act (CTSCA)’s failure to force disclosure. It has been posited that criminal 
liability may even be necessary to induce the desired levels of detail in reporting under MSA 
(e.g. English, 2019). 
Our understanding of organisational MSA compliance to date shows that organisations face 
a complex set of considerations, many of them not directly under the focal firm’s purview. 
This has resulted in varying degree of MSA compliance, including some instances of 
organisational hypocrisy, which may in part be explained by the experimentalist governance 
nature of the legislation itself.
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Experimentalist governance
The theoretical underpinning of the mechanisms through which experimentalist governance 
operates – experimentalist governance theory – has been most clearly espoused by Sabel 
and Zeitlin (2012). They posit that the process of experimentalist governance involves a 
four-stage iterative cycle to achieve legislative aims. First, the legislature enacts a law 
setting out framework goals or principles; second, entities within the scope of the regulation 
are given significant discretion in how they respond in order to encourage a diversity of 
response that provides the basis of the following stage; third, those entities report regularly 
on the actions they have taken and take part in a peer review process intended to identify 
best practice and therefore drive up standards; finally, goals are revised periodically as the 
report-and-review process identifies problems. In doing so, such legislation anticipates the 
development of competitive dynamics as organisations attempt to respond to stakeholder 
concerns.
In forcing all commercial organisations with a turnover above £36m to report on their 
supply chain activities, the avowed aim of MSA is to create a level playing field for 
commercial entities by setting minimum standards, allowing organisations to demonstrate 
how seriously they take the issue (LeBaron and Ruhmkorf, 2017). Accountants will recognise 
in this a form of the principles-based approach to standards setting (e.g. Baker and Hayes, 
2004; Carmona and Trombetta, 2008; Nelson, 2003; Schipper, 2003). This flexibility is borne 
of early twentieth century thinkers’ belief that, in order to be practical, governance should 
be adaptable (e.g. Dewey, 1927). It is intended to drive up standards in successive reporting 
cycles (Lindsay et al., 2017).
In the context of MSA, we would anticipate something akin to the following process. First, 
following engagement with organisations which will be in scope, the UK government enacts 
the law; second, each organisation individually creates a plan to undertake due diligence in 
order to establish the impacts their purchasing has on workers in their supply chains by 
engaging with suppliers and experts to identify risks, and then works to that plan, recording 
results against key performance indicators and building a narrative of the organisation’s 
work to minimise risk to workers; third, each organisation publishes its own statement 
describing the actions it has taken in the prior year and those to be taken in the next, 
comparing planned against delivered in statements from year 2 onward. This is followed by 
a rigorous peer review process in which organisations investigate actions taken by their 
peers in order to adopt best practice from across all reporting organisations; fourth, the UK 
government, having identified issues independently and in consultation with stakeholders, 
periodically updates the legislation.
Experimentalist governance emerged as an attempt to move away from the traditional 
methods of developing and implementing privately-developed standards, which had failed 
to mandate behaviour (Bartley, 2014). Originally used in a closely-related format in the USA 
for governance of food standards (Wengle, 2016), the method recognises the limitations of 
imposing rules on organisations in a fast-moving context such as commerce, preferring 
bottom-up flexibility overseen by a wider range of stakeholders than the state (Sabel and 
Zeitlin, 2012). Deakin (2009) suggests that, used as a complementary system, 
experimentalist governance can harmonise with national policy to deliver wider goals, a 
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view that emphasises the essential transnational nature of experimentalist governance (De 
Búrca et al., 2014).
Significant issues with the experimentalist governance approach have been identified. 
Mendez (2011) asserts that reporting mechanisms allied with a peer review process are key 
to the success of the system, and that, lacking greater structure and robust reflexive 
assessment, the system is unlikely to improve from an ineffective base. It relies on a level of 
variation in performance, for the continuous improvement cycle to drive organisational 
change, of which legislators are generally wary (Hess, 2008). Indeed, the process appears to 
work best in conditions that promote freedom for those under its obligations to derive 
unexpected, experimental solutions (Heilmann et al., 2013). Where the process has been 
applied to tackle modern slavery in supply chains, Cossart et al. (2017) claim that the French 
Duty of Vigilance law rests on the assumption that organisations will seek to reduce harm to 
individuals on the basis of mitigating organisational risk. While this method is thus far 
unproven, Brazil’s National Pact to Eradicate Slave Labour (‘The Pact’) has demonstrated the 
success that strict legal enforcement might offer (Feasley, 2015).
A further criticism that emerges from the literature is that, in setting intentionally loose 
initial standards (Zeitlin, 2005), experimentalist governance allows those organisations in 
jurisdictions in which liberal, democratic principles have not been institutionalised (Kumm, 
2012) to avoid full participation. This may go some way towards explaining why focal 
organisations with supply chains in, for example, less democratic countries find compliance 
difficult. 
The public sector as a context
The only part of the public sector obliged to involve itself in the iterative process of the 
experimentalist governance-informed MSA is higher education (HE) (Martin-Ortega, 2017), 
which is the chosen context for our study. UK HE is also obliged to comply with public sector 
procurement legislation. HE spends significant amounts on high-risk goods, including 
technology, textiles and food (Keenan, 2017). Research on university responses to MSA is 
scarce. What we do know is that “a significant number of universities are yet to undertake 
fundamental steps towards identifying risks in their own supply chains and developing 
suitable and effective due diligence processes” (Martin-Ortega and Krupinska, 2018: 14), a 
key aspect of engagement with the spirit of the law.
Problems with taking transformative action over sustainability issues may be seen as a 
result of the traditional desire within the sector to get the best value for taxpayer money, a 
key consideration in public contracts (Loader, 2007). This has led to the  adoption of 
collective purchasing mechanisms, which the public sector has used to deliver economies of 
scale for several decades (Blome et al., 2014; Murray et al., 2008). The resulting 
organisations – purchasing consortia – negotiate purchasing frameworks on behalf of PSOs, 
leaving ordering to local organisations (Meehan and Bryde, 2015). This has raised doubts 
about the role and effectiveness of procurement departments in contributing to 
organization-level strategy (Schiele and McCue, 2006).  
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The requirement to deliver cost efficiency through economies of scale highlighted by the 
structure of public sector purchasing is not the only pressure on PSOs, however. Political 
influence has brought expectations of social and environmental responsibility which can 
conflict with price obligations (Boeger, 2017; Loader, 2011; Murray, 2009). While there has 
been a degree of success in progress towards environmental sustainability in parts of the UK 
public sector, social sustainability has lagged despite the collective potential to bring about 
change in labour conditions (Martin-Ortega, 2018; Martin-Ortega et al., 2015) and an 
increased focus on social implications of procurement (Walker and Phillips, 2009).
The UK Modern Slavery Act 2015 represents an attempt, through disclosure, to tackle a 
major social problem which has recently gained significant attention across public and 
private sectors. The nature of the law, as a piece of experimentalist governance (which 
necessitates regular disclosure and peer review), offers scholars an opportunity to 
investigate the process of legal compliance through investigating how organisations go 
about reporting as well as what those disclosures state. Public sector organisations offer 
both a highly visible and under-researched context for such study.
Methodology
We focused our empirical study on the UK HE sector. As a sector, UK HE spends over £15bn 
a year on goods and services (Universities UK, 2018), much of which is known to be from 
categories and geographies which pose a high risk of modern slavery (LUPC, 2020). There is 
a total of 164 HEIs in the UK (Universities UK, 2019), of which 131 had a turnover of £36 
million or more in 2017/2018 (HEFCE, 2019). These 131 institutions are therefore required 
to comply with MSA. 
Pilot study
Before commencing the main study, we conducted a small but important pilot study. We 
began in November 2018 by downloading all publicly available modern slavery statements 
from UK universities’ websites, which allowed us to conduct a preliminary content analysis 
on the 118 universities in scope which had a findable report. It quickly became apparent 
that there was a significant similarity across most of the reports. To understand this 
phenomenon further, we contacted the University Secretaries of five universities which 
were within the scope of MSA. University Secretaries were chosen specifically as their role 
comes with overarching responsibility for university regulatory and governance compliance. 
However, it became clear from talking to them that MSA compliance had been delegated to 
the Procurement department, to which we were thus directed. Upon interviewing these 
professionals, it also became evident that similarities between statements might be 
attributable to structural qualities in HE, and we therefore approached the main study 
better informed and with a clear theoretical perspective.
For the interviews conducted as part of the pilot study and the full research, all respondents 
were given anonymity from the point of interview transcription. The sample of university 
statements and the sample of respondents are therefore separate and, although we quote 
from statements, we have ensured that no interviewee can be identified from this paper.
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Sample
We were able to obtain an e-mail address for the person responsible for MSA compliance 
for 104 of the 131 universities in scope of MSA. Of those 104, 56 did not respond to our 
request for an interview, and a further 15 engaged in some limited email exchange before 
deciding against further participation. Our final sample thus consisted of professional 
services staff from 33 universities, which represented over 25% of the total population of 
universities required to comply. Of the 33, only seven were not part of the Procurement 
function. These individuals were legal (5) or sustainability professionals (2). This sample size 
compares favourably to other studies which have sought to investigate social and/or 
environmental issues pertaining to UK HE (e.g. Snelson-Powell et al., 2016). The positions of 
these respondents and their anonymised universities can be seen in table 1.
[Insert table 1 around here]
Data collection
Interviews were conducted between December 2018 and July 2019. One author conducted 
all interviews to ensure consistency in questioning, approach and style throughout the data 
collection process (Kong and Ramia, 2010). The average length of the telephone interviews 
was 55 minutes, with a range of 40-65. Once the data had been recorded, each interview 
was transcribed using voice recognition software before transcriptions were cleaned for 
errors, which resulted in 107 single-spaced pages of transcribed data. 
We designed an interview protocol which was based on a semi-structured interview 
approach. Appendix 1 outlines the standardised questions asked of each respondent. Our 
questions sought to gain a clear sense of how universities considered modern slavery when 
engaging in procurement, what they did to comply with the legislation and whether or how 
procurement practices had changed since the introduction of MSA. 
Data analysis
We engaged in an abductive analytical approach. Abductive analysis starts from the basis of 
a provisional explanation of a phenomenon, and through data collection and analysis the 
researcher pursues that explanation to seek evidence which challenges, confirms or changes 
it (Kennedy and Thornberg, 2018). Abductive research is often spurred on by an unexpected 
finding and key to this form of analysis is the continued commuting between data and 
theory, with a view to provide the best possible explanation for the phenomenon. 
Abductive reasoning encourages continued and iterative theoretical engagement and 
knowledge of the phenomenon, in a way that is generally not encouraged with pure 
inductive reasoning. Since we had a baseline working assumption of how universities 
engaged with MSA through consortia purchasing from our pilot study, and we had a 
conceptual frame of experimentalist governance, abductive analysis was appropriate for our 
investigation (e.g. Timmermans and Tavory, 2012). 
With our knowledge of intra- and inter-organisational collaboration on compiling modern 
slavery statements from the pilot study, we had a foundation upon which to build our 
analyses. Once the interviews were complete, we began carrying out microanalysis on the 
transcripts. This involved the “detailed, line-by-line analysis necessary at the beginning of a 
study to generate initial categories” (Strauss and Corbin, 1998: 57). We drew these initial 
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categories out through multiple readings of the data by highlighting patterns that appeared 
across interviews, repeated and contradictory claims in several different interviews, and 
also unusual or outlier data (Laughlin, 1995). These pre-codes (Layder, 1998) were titled 
with direct quotes from respondents to keep the emergent analysis as close to the original 
data as possible.
Once we had completed the first stage of coding, we followed Braun and Clarke’s (2006) 
step-by-step process for qualitative data analysis. We began by linking similar codes into 
preliminary themes. First order codes on existing modes of collaboration and pre-
benchmarking therefore became the second order code safety in numbers; inability to see 
the sector’s collective buying power and fear of a lack of supply chain knowledge became 
procurement deskilled; the view that MSA lacks teeth and Board inaction became Act not 
seen as a priority. By repeatedly re-examining the data and by revisiting the literature on 
the failures of disclosure legislation to drive supply chain action, candidate themes began to 
emerge from our data. As we revisited both our dataset and the literature, particularly on 
experimentalist governance, it became clear that some of these candidate themes had 
insufficient data to support them or that the data of which they consisted were not similar 
enough to be meaningfully considered together. The whole dataset was then reread in 
order to ensure both that the themes were an accurate reflection of the data and that 
nothing had been missed. Our second order codes of ‘safety in numbers’ and ‘reinforcing 
limits to engagement’ therefore became the final theme Herding; ‘Procurement not treated 
as strategic’ and ‘Procurement deskilled’ became Organised incapacitation; and ‘Act not a 
priority for Councils’ and ‘lack of a critical eye at Board level’ became Atrophied 
accountability. 
The process by which these themes were generated can be seen in figure 1.
[Insert figure 1 around here]
Findings
Our findings offer important new insights into universities’ responses to MSA disclosure. We 
start here with an overview of key trends in that disclosure. 
Given the public mission of universities, we might expect that HE would engage fully with 
MSA. However, relatively limited engagement with MSA is in evidence, despite a greater 
level of compliance compared with companies. While our data suggest that there are 
significant problems of commitment to compliance with the spirit of the law, it is worth 
noting that when this research was conducted, over 90% of universities had published a 
statement, compared to only 73% of organisations overall (TISC Report, 2019), 27% of HE 
organisations were fully compliant, against 23% across all organisations (Business and 
Human Rights Resource Centre, 2019). HE effort, as well as failing to translate into 
meaningful supply chain action, is therefore also largely limited to publication of a 
statement rather than a deeper engagement with the aims of the Act, and which is in any 
case fully compliant with MSA in only around a quarter of cases.
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This limited engagement can be found in the modern slavery statements published by 
universities, which broadly show significant similarities in content. For example, without 
offering explanation of how risk assessments are carried out, or what actions are taken as a 
result of this work, many universities include statements such as:
 “Within the University Supply Chain, category spend in key industries such as, Construction, 
Travel, Catering, Furniture, IT/Computer Supplies and Utilities, has been identified as high 
risk in relation to Modern Slavery” (University of Glasgow, 2019).
 “The principal areas which carry material risks are office supplies, laboratory consumables, 
ICT and AV equipment, and some estates services, such as cleaning and construction” 
(Imperial College London, 2019).
  “High-risk categories such as office supplies, laboratory consumables, ICT equipment and 
some estates (facilities management) services” (Swansea University, 2018).
Similarly, in terms of expectations universities state that they place on their suppliers, there 
is a lack of rationale, of evidence of action, and of variation. Many organisations include in 
their report statements such as:
 “The University’s standard contractual terms and conditions used when procuring goods, 
service and works include provisions that embed the requirements of the Modern Slavery 
Act and provide the University with the powers to request information from our suppliers on 
the nature of their supply chains where necessary” (University of Bath, 2018).
  “We only use reputable Contractors and expect them to have adequate monitoring 
procedures and certifications in place” (University of Wolverhampton, 2018).
 “We require suppliers to conform to our Corporate, Social and Environmental Responsibility 
Policy” (Durham University, 2019).
This lack of variation is caused by both pre-existing and new conditions. Our data show that 
a number of different modes of collaboration have resulted in universities responding in a 
largely similar manner – and that there are issues of structure underlying this. We describe 
here the themes and dimensions of these cooperative responses. We find that the sector is 
herding together in a way that subverts the avowed spirit of MSA and, though the structures 
that enable this pre-date MSA (sometimes by decades), their use enables respondent 
organisations to ensure that scrutiny on the sector is reduced; that an organised incapacity 
brought about in response to prior operational and legal considerations has created 
structural boundaries to a more serious engagement with the Act; and that it has responded 
with an atrophied accountability, which describes deficiencies at the executive level of 
organisations. Together, the factors explained by these inter-related constructs undermine 
the logic behind MSA as a piece of experimentalist governance legislation. Figure 2 
represents the experimentalist governance process outlined by Sabel and Zeitlin (2012) and 
demonstrates where this process is subverted by university actions around MSA. In the 
following sub-sections, we explain these factors and their effects on experimentalist 
governance in detail.
[Insert figure 2 around here]
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1. Herding
We find that universities have attempted to ensure that attention on the sector is kept to a 
minimum through a practice of herding. Among the most common topics raised during the 
interviews was that of collaboration, including the longevity of cooperative support services 
mechanisms such as purchasing consortia. HEIs have for many decades conducted their 
purchasing through consortia. The consortia have negotiated contract frameworks with 
suppliers on behalf of universities, who in turn have relied on these frameworks to place 
orders and access more competitive prices as a result of the frameworks the consortia 
negotiated. 
This collaborative spirit has extended to MSA. A significant amount of collective effort has 
been spent by many HEIs on ensuring that smaller universities are helped in their disclosure 
efforts through sharing of what larger organisations are doing, and by production of a 
template statement to be completed to ensure compliance. By comparison, we found no 
evidence of inter-university collaboration on due diligence efforts in supply chains: several 
respondents stated that they could not do this. 
From these insights we understand that universities have effectively engaged in herding – 
not so as to evade their responsibilities, but in the true sense of herding, i.e. to protect the 
collective. Ultimately, this ensures that organisations are broadly compliant with MSA, 
which reduces the risk of the sector (which sees itself as under scrutiny given its public 
visibility), from receiving unwanted attention. We describe this practice as having the 
dimensions of collaborative responses, created by universities interacting during the 
reporting process rather than once statements are published, and templating, characterised 
by the use of shared, standardised responses to guarantee compliance. We now explain 
these themes.
1.1 Templating
There are modes of collaboration that limit the sector’s engagement with MSA through a 
process of templating. Our data show examples of a significant reliance on sources of advice 
which encourage box-ticking. We encountered both examples of the use of an actual 
template developed by a consortium soon after MSA came into force. There were also 
examples of advice from legal advisors which suggested that universities should go no 
further than baseline compliance with the Act. There was also some evidence of a lack of 
advice and resources from a professional body representing procurement professionals that 
limits professionals’ ability to learn and develop their universities’ responses which is a key 
assumption of MSA (Voss et al., 2019).
Several respondents discussed using a template at various times since MSA came into force. 
This included a Head of Procurement who stated that, “in year one we got a template 
actually from someone else and we pretty much just wrote down what they’d done” 
(University 26). Similar to others who mentioned a template that had been sent out by a 
purchasing consortium, this respondent did not see the problem with ‘anchoring’ their 
organisation’s response in such a rudimentary way. Given that MSA invites organisations to 
improve their disclosures year-on-year, and the differences in those responses can be 
compared to draw out best practice, the lack of depth in engagement seen to date might be 
attributable to universities beginning the process by starting from the same statement.
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Similarly, advice (and lack of it) has shaped the limited response to MSA from universities to 
date. Several respondents discussed legal seminars they attended in 2015 at which lawyers 
explained that universities were in scope of the Act, what was expected, and how to 
comply. This focus on compliance, while understandable as a baseline, is not in the spirit of 
the legislation. One respondent described how their Finance Director had attended a 
seminar at which the speaker had advised “this pragmatic approach: you don't need to have 
policy, just be focused on the criteria they put in the legislation so we had to say what our 
business was and how big our turnover and that kind of thing; who are the suppliers are 
that kind of thing over the last 3 years" (University 9). While a potentially rational approach 
to basic compliance, this advice does not give universities anything to build on in future 
years, which is an experimentalist governance mechanism through which MSA was designed 
to drive a continuous improvement in reporting standards (Deakin, 2009; Flynn and Walker, 
2020).
While many respondents agreed that they or someone else from their organisation had 
attended one of the many seminars that were held in 2015, some respondents were also 
clear that they had expected advice from procurement’s professional body, the Chartered 
Institute of Procurement and Supply (CIPS). One interviewee stated that he was a regular 
attendee of his local CIPS group and had not heard the topic of modern slavery come up 
once.  
As well as initial advice that was made available by professional services firms, most of our 
respondent universities are using supplier data sharing products such as NETpositive. These 
are platforms and other useful tools which enable members to view data for suppliers they 
share with other members. This helps to prevent duplication of contact with those suppliers 
who might otherwise be approached by dozens of customers about the same issue. These 
platforms enable universities to see, for example, which of these shared suppliers has 
published a modern slavery statement for the period. However, our data show limited 
knowledge of how these platforms actually work, and evidence that universities have not 
engaged sufficiently with them to take advantage of the potential for developing policies 
and practices to tackle modern slavery more broadly and engage with the legislation more 
fully.
1.2 Collaborative responses
In contrast to the use of an actual template from a consortium from the outset, 
collaborative responses refers to inter-university cooperation during the reporting phase. HE 
professional services cooperation, which pre-dates MSA, is used by universities to 
collaborate in response to meeting their organisations’ obligations under MSA. This occurs 
in a variety of ways along a spectrum of formality. We note that their contribution to the 
lack of variation in reporting can be gauged from some examples, which we highlight for 
their uniqueness or as examples of more or less formal arrangements outside the scope of 
the purchasing consortia.
Two organisations – Loughborough University and the University of Leicester – share a 
Director of Procurement (Trotter, 2019). This has led to the production of near-identical 
statements, including a section on,
Page 13 of 37 Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
Accounting, Auditing and Accountability Journal
14
“Supplier adherence to our values:
We have zero tolerance to modern slavery. As well as taking mitigating measures 
through the procurement/contract management process (including adding 
appropriate pre-qualification/tender questions and standard contract clauses), 
the University expressed this policy, explained the Modern Slavery Act and the 
related measures we have added to our processes, at local supplier events” 
(Loughborough University, 2018; University of Leicester, 2018).
Similarly, Queen Margaret University has outsourced its Procurement function to the 
University of Edinburgh (Queen Margaret University Edinburgh, 2018). In terms of reporting 
under MSA, this comes with results that might be anticipated. Both organisations’ reports 
are almost identically laid out, beginning with the phrase, “[we] are committed to protecting 
and respecting human rights and have a zero tolerance approach to slavery and human 
trafficking in all its forms” (Queen Margaret University Edinburgh, 2018; University of 
Edinburgh, 2018).
Other examples include procurement staff from the twelve universities in the West 
Midlands coming together several times a year to discuss responsible purchasing issues. This 
manifests itself in the shared use of phraseology such as, “We are committed to ensuring 
that there is no modern slavery or human trafficking in our supply chains or in any part of 
our business” (Aston University, 2018; Coventry University, 2018; De Montfort University, 
2018). While these meetings pre-date MSA and are used to ensure the sharing of best 
practice, there is certainly an element of the spirit of the law being undermined as a 
consequence of these interactions. Experimentalist governance relies on a feedback process 
which involves individual action followed by rigorous peer review (Deakin, 2009; Sabel and 
Zeitlin, 2012). Our data show that responses to MSA are discussed at these meetings. We do 
not suggest that there is anything untoward in this but question the application of the law 
to an industry with a long history of collaboration, which would need to be unwound (at 
significant cost and damage to operations).
There are other, less formal, forms of cooperation, which include former private sector 
colleagues sharing pre-publication statements, and three Heads of Procurement at similarly 
sized universities meeting, and engaging their teams to meet, to discuss ethical 
procurement practices, including responses to MSA.
In MSA terms, these collaborative efforts have at times been employed to ensure that no 
individual industry member strays too far from the collective. A Sustainability Manager at a 
large organisation (University 8) sees this as one of the main goals of the sector’s 
collaborative efforts:
"I think in terms of improving sector reporting, the question is how can we 
work together to help institutions with less capacity and less background in 
this area to improve their statements and thus their actions. A well-facilitated 
workshop via existing networks […] might help, but I suspect an issue is 
people not having enough time to devote to this."
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A Procurement Manager at a large university supported this, informing us that they send 
their unpublished statement to smaller HEIs so that those universities can see if there is 
anything to be borrowed. This suggests a duality of purpose for sector-wide collaboration. 
First, that larger, wealthier, and more mature universities have a duty to help smaller 
organisations which are deemed less able to meet their obligations under MSA. This 
contrasts sharply with the collaboration for improved monitoring and due diligence that 
Benstead et al. (2018) observed in private firms’ supply chains, which operates at a deeper 
level to share meaningful data on suppliers further up supply chains. Secondly, even given 
this assistance, there are Procurement departments too resource-constrained to be able to 
attend to receive help.
Perhaps unsurprisingly in the sector, academics have become involved to help with 
benchmarking. Dr. Olga Martin-Ortega at the University of Greenwich publishes an annual 
report on the state of university MSA compliance (Martin-Ortega and Islam, 2017; Martin-
Ortega and Krupinska, 2018) which highlights good practice, pinpoints areas for 
improvement, and elucidates how universities could progress both individually and 
collectively. We encountered respondents who claimed that these reports are more 
important to them than their own benchmarking exercises, for example: “I haven't looked at 
any other statements. I have looked at Olga Martin-Ortega’s report. And we got a 
particularly good commendation for something that we've done on our report but it's not 
necessarily a proactive thing so actively nothing at all” (Head of Procurement, University 
28). Some respondents described Dr. Martin-Ortega’s work as akin to doing the 
benchmarking for the sector.
This collective view of the sector is a common one. A Procurement Manager at a large 
university (University 17) was very clear about this:
"We're part of the same club, anyway, overall flying the flag for British 
education and in a way and we continue to raise standards. Yeah, and the 
Russell Group universities certainly should be seen leading and some of the 
smaller universities don't have the same resource that we do."
Inherent in this comment is the assertion that, at least in terms of MSA, the collaborative 
ecosystem around university Procurement departments exists to ensure that none are ‘left 
behind’ regarding MSA. Rather than acting as a mechanism for the aspirational continuous 
improvement in MSA, these structures are being seen and used to ensure sector herding.
In sum, HE procurement professionals expend significant effort on a wide range of intra-
sectoral collaborations. Although in a broader sense these mechanisms provide valuable 
bases for knowledge exchange and cost savings, in terms of responding to MSA they have 
ensured that organisations comply with their basic obligations. While this has had the 
intended effect, it has reinforced the limitations inherent in the actions taken, focusing 
attention on the letter of MSA and subverting the discretion organisations are given under 
MSA to develop different practices.
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2. Organised incapacity
UK universities make a significant proportion of their purchases, particularly of products 
such as electronics, apparel, and food, which are known to be high-risk in modern slavery 
terms, through framework agreements negotiated by purchasing consortia. The role of 
these organisations is that of a “shared service with the aim of delivering maximum value 
from the purchase of goods and services. With institution income reducing and costs rising 
[they] have an ever increasingly important role to play.” (North East Universities Purchasing 
Consortium, 2019).
Our data reveal that since universities have come to rely on purchasing through consortia to 
ensure financial value for money and legal compliance, many university Procurement 
departments have either lost the ability to actively manage supply chains or have not felt 
the need to develop these skills. The historical focus of procurement was cost, and both the 
skill sets of relevant university departments and the consortium structures around them 
have naturally developed to fit these transactional requirements. In our context, this has left 
universities lacking the capabilities to engage with MSA much beyond compliance. HE has, 
for example, used its collective consumption, through regional purchasing consortia, to 
negotiate lower prices for high-volume, repeat goods from IT equipment, stationery and 
furniture to laboratory chemicals. MSA, however, requires a depth of knowledge about, and 
active management of, supply chains which our data suggest is incompatible with this 
structure. In terms of MSA, the consortia are currently an unintentional barrier to 
universities’ ability to fully engage with the Act. A Procurement Manager offered a refrain 
encountered in most interviews – that universities “don’t have the resources to send staff to 
check factories” – before adding that they “have skills as buyers,” (University 22) contrasting 
that particular ability with that of supply chain management.
This organised incapacity – a structural removal of issues of supply chain management from 
universities – has led to a significant reliance on the consortia. Expounding a commonly 
expressed dependence, a Procurement Manager at a medium-sized university stated that, 
“we kind of rely on the purchasing consortia to address a lot of the sustainability issues” 
(University 5). While sustainability, and even sustainability disclosure, is arguably best 
managed collectively, the experimentalist governance underlying MSA anticipates a 
different approach (Deakin, 2009; Voss et al., 2019), which is difficult to envisage happening 
in the present HE context in the UK.
2.1 Procurement not treated as strategic
At the heart of this structural incapacity is a common belief among our respondents that 
universities do not treat Procurement as a strategic function. This sentiment manifests itself 
in several ways. First, the only respondent universities with direct Procuremen  
representation on their Boards were those small enough for Finance to physicall  carry out 
tasks generally assigned to a separate Procurement department. Without exception, despite 
between a third and a half of universities’ “influenceable” spending being the responsibility 
of Procurement, purchasing staff report through Finance.
Often, the perception that purchasing functions are not viewed as strategic comes down to 
the resources such functions are able to expend on complying with legislation such as MSA. 
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The majority of respondents spoke in terms such as, “we don't have the resource to explore 
supply chains” (University 10; University 31). Deprived of the means to conduct genuine 
supply chain monitoring and management, those tasked with complying with MSA have 
little choice but to adopt basic legal compliance as the goal and not a foundation to be built 
on. By way of both contrast with experience in the private sector and a potential rationale 
for Procurement being used as a basic value and compliance function, a Deputy Head of 
Procurement stressed that,
“When I worked in private industry, I knew my suppliers, even though some of 
the ones we spoke to didn’t seem up to much with the origin of their products. 
But from our perspective, what we buy does not necessarily have that link to 
what we produce (i.e. students)” (University 26).
This apparent disconnect between what is seen as the ultimate purpose of a university and 
the work required for that purpose emphasises the awareness among HE procurement 
professionals that their role is not viewed as strategic at Board level. This method of 
administration constrains Procurement’s ability to conduct the supply chain due diligence 
required, removing what would constitute progress under MSA and limiting the purpose of 
post-publication peer review.
2.2 Procurement deskilled
The skills shortage highlighted by our data, while observable on a spectrum of proficiency 
levels, is best captured by a Director of Finance, who asserted that their organisation had 
“identified the supply chain as the highest risk area for modern slavery and human 
trafficking” (University 16). That the pertinent section of MSA is called Transparency in 
Supply Chains (Modern Slavery Act 2015 c.30, 2015) makes it clear that the area of concern 
is the supply chain, but such is the rudimentary nature of many universities’ approaches, 
they are still discovering these issues years after MSA was enacted.
The lack of supply chain management skills at universities has led to the adoption of a 
rudimentary level of assurance, for example through updating the terms of contracts to 
reflect the need for modern slavery statements, where applicable. Administrative efforts 
such as this show a clear desire – evident across respondents – to demonstrate 
organisational responsibility. However, while there is a widespread feeling that compliance 
so far has been about “trying to figure out the university’s role in all this beyond some 
generic statement,” (Procurement Manager, University 5) there is also the knowledge that 
contract amendments do not create the necessary action. In the words of one Head of 
Procurement, while a clause allowing the university to perform an unannounced supplier 
audit is in a contract, “I think we would be the first university ever to do that” (University 
22).
In combination, the lack of supply chain management skills and management perception of 
procurement as not strategic have reduced much of the university response to MSA to box-
ticking. That is, rather than have a strategy for how to approach wider issues of worker 
exploitation and modern slavery and then disclose activities which have been undertaken in 
order to build towards tackling those problems as experimentalist governance requires 
(Deakin, 2009; Sabel and Zeitlin, 2012), Procurement functions have had to engage 
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reactively with the legislation. Several respondents admitted that consideration for 
disclosure often comes in the few weeks or months leading up to publication of the 
statement, and that the basic idea from the previous year is built on by summarising 
changes to circumstances that have occurred in the prior financial period. This is most 
starkly captured by a University Solicitor who conceded that the high-level process involved 
in collating information at their small organisation consists of “making sure we capture 
anythi g good that’s come out of the university” (University 5).
The experimentalist governance ambition of MSA – that activities at focal organisations will 
force first tier suppliers to take action, creating flow of expectation and action through the 
lower levels (Flynn and Walker, 2020) – is therefore undermined at lead universities in HE. A 
Head of Procurement explained that,
“I haven’t witnessed a lot of cascading down the supply chain since I came here. 
We do talk about it in terms of us being a university that does a lot around 
[sustainability], but I think one of the problems is that there is so much to do 
anyway, and [tackling] modern slavery is a really hard thing to realistically do” 
(University 31).
Since the disclosure encouraged by MSA is perceived as overly difficult by HE, engaging tiers 
further down supply chains cannot happen and the limited engagement that does occur is 
therefore often confined to attempting to ensure compliance.
While ‘cascading’ may not have taken root in HE practices, attempts are at least made by 
some to ensure that they do not miss developments in practice made elsewhere. Many 
respondents use some form of benchmarking in order to underpin their compliance 
approach. This is partly held responsible by some in HE for the uniformity of statements in 
the sector. Some have looked beyond their own industry to discover best practice from 
private sector organisations. However, while this allows universities to better understand 
how firms with experience and expertise in supply chain management are engaging with the 
legislation, this knowledge appears to have had little impact on their own statements. These 
have remained reactive and policy-driven, adopting none of the risk assessment, 
performance measures, due diligence, monitoring, or governance mentioned in statements 
by firms cited. As a result, the cycle anticipated by experimentalist governance (Deakin, 
2009; Sabel and Zeitlin, 2012) has been circumscribed, making periodic review of the 
legislation difficult since it inhibits meaningful progress.
In short, the HE sector has been facing faced consistent pressure over a number of years to 
ensure that value is delivered through procurement and is structurally not set up to engage 
effectively with a law such as MSA. Much of the contact that universities would ordinarily 
have as buyers with suppliers has been outsourced to small, specialised purchasing 
consortia which have existed to reduce costs rather than to involve themselves with lower 
tiers of supply chains, and which are themselves too resource-constrained to do so.
3. Atrophied accountability
While universities have engaged in a practice we term herding in order to reduce the 
chances of HEIs coming under the spotlight on MSA and demonstrated an organised 
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incapacity in their ability to engage more fully with the legislation, the sector has also 
exhibited, with regard to modern slavery, what we term an atrophied accountability. This 
final theme to emerge from our analysis, which refers specifically to executive functions at 
HEIs, speaks to a widespread reluctance of executives to engage with the process both in 
terms of driving action and conducting the necessary governance to ensure that HEIs are 
fully compliant. We would expect a lack of shareholders at Board level at HEIs to translate 
into a more considered, longer-term, and risk averse approach, whereas we find instead the 
absence of a key critical eye. The governance deficit on MSA can be seen as perhaps the 
most important facet in the failure of experimentalist governance since it removes a central 
element of organisational governance and the leadership required to engage in an iterative 
process of continuous improvement (Christ et al., 2019; Voss et al., 2019). It also therefore 
underpins the perpetuation of the first two themes.
3.1 The UK Modern Slavery Act 2015 is not a priority for Boards
While respondents uniformly stated that the resources necessary to engage more deeply 
with regards to modern slavery reporting were not available, the lack of importance 
attached to purchasing functions by universities manifests itself in other ways. We 
encountered several respondents who had heard about their university’s obligations under 
the UK Modern Slavery Act 2015 not through their organisation’s Board or legal 
department, but through the Higher Education Procurement Association (HEPA) or their 
regional consortium. Although University Secretaries are responsible for receipt and 
dissemination of the legal obligations of HE organisations neither they, nor legal 
departments generally, informed Procurement that legislation was being drafted, had been 
enacted, or what organisational responsibilities were under it. One Head of Procurement 
explained that they had relied on an external stakeholder for the news, saying, “When it 
came into force, we were approached by HEPA to check that we were aware of the modern 
slavery requirements” (University 19). While this demonstrates the functioning of 
collaborative ecosystems around Procurement, it might also show that third party 
stakeholders are aware of universities’ inability to act top-down on the legislation.
Internally, this inability seems already clearly understood. Respondents made a variety of 
comments to this effect, explaining that, “there was a bit of information out there” 
(University 10); “when I came into post [we didn’t have a statement]” (University 12); “we 
tried to get our heads around what it actually is, does it apply to universities” (University 
29); “luckily, my predecessor had picked it up” (University 27); “it probably would have been 
through LUPC [London Universities Purchasing Consortium] [that I heard about it]” 
(University 28). Many HE professionals tasked with disclosure under MSA appear to have no 
expectation that they would be informed about the legislation by their organisation’s Board. 
Given the level of engagement with the legal process required by experimentalist 
governance, Procurement departments, left to make decisions of significant public visibility 
and supply chain importance, have been neither empowered nor enabled to contribute.
3.2 Lack of a critical eye at board level
Among the factors influencing this Board-level abdication on the reporting process, our data 
show a large number of organisations at which the Boards are insufficiently questioning of 
their organisations with regard to MSA. Respondents explained that it is a struggle to make 
MSA a priority with the Board. Several told us that they had inherited poor statements 
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which had gone unnoticed by executives. Except for one organisation, which had recently 
appointed to its executive a former Board member from a large private sector corporation, 
there was little to suggest that boards are providing a level of scrutiny likely to push 
performance beyond pure compliance.
Some universities have had problems complying at all. The Head of Procurement at a small 
university asserted that “there still isn’t ownership from the university, it’s probably not 
high on the agenda” (University 19) before explaining that for a second year in a row they 
have not been able to find a Board member willing to sign the statement, one of the three 
actions required to comply fully with the legislation. Another Head of Procurement had 
similar issues getting a signature, while the Head of Procurement at a medium-sized 
organisation asserted that they had been unable to convince the Marketing department 
that the statement needed to be displayed on the home page of the university website, 
another aspect of legal compliance.
Perhaps a key indicator of the lack of attention Boards are paying to MSA comes from a 
Procurement Manager at one of the regional purchasing consortia. In October 2018, the 
Home Office sent a letter to all organisations required to comply with MSA suggesting that 
non-compliant firms would have action taken against them (Home Office, 2018). Despite the 
threat of legal action, the consortium Procurement Manager received no questions or 
feedback about the letter. Interestingly, some respondents claim to have not seen the 
letter, or heard of it, suggesting that the letter may be arriving at Board, which is not 
informing Procurement of the news. This suggests a level of disconnection which renders 
the reporting cycle inherent in experimentalist governance (Flynn and Walker, 2020; Sabel 
and Zeitlin, 2012) legislation beyond the reach of Procurement and outside the interest of 
the Board.
This separation of Board and Procurement functions also affects the latter’s ability to 
influence responsible purchasing day-to-day. A Procurement Manager stated that, 
“departmental and academic staff routinely make purchases outside agreed frameworks, 
and there is currently little we can do to influence that” (University 2). This leaves 
Procurement attempting to manage a supply chain process without knowing which product 
(i.e. supply chain) to oversee.
There is ample evidence of how little attention Boards are paying to their purchasing 
departments. Our data show the widespread absence of an impediment to collaboration at 
executive level. HE Procurement departments appear not to see themselves as competing. 
A Head of Procurement explained that, “there is no competitive advantage to be gained by 
keeping your approach to yourself” (University 2). This comment suggests two things to us. 
First, that such little consideration is given to Procurement at Board level that purchasing 
departments are free to view themselves as not in competition with one another. Second, 
there are insufficient leading universities and assistance from the procurement 
infrastructure around HE to enable the sector to engage in any level of supply chain 
management practices beyond the rudimentary measures of contract clauses and modern 
slavery statement checks. If the more mature universities are free to share their 
approaches, and across the sector there persists little evidence of deep engagement with 
the legislation, a lack of proficiency in those practices is both a logical explanation and one 
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that is clear in our data. From an experimentalist governance perspective, this interruption 
of the iterative process (Flynn and Walker, 2020; Sabel and Zeitlin, 2012) from the outset 
brings into question the sector’s inclusion in the scope of the Act.
The legislative burden that universities deal with, and the lack of cases brought against 
organisations which have not complied with MSA, has led to MSA not being treated as a 
priority by university Boards. This has isolated Procurement functions, reduced compliance 
levels, and increased the risk of scrutiny on the sector which inter-organisational 
collaboration has worked to reduce.
Discussion 
In this article, we provide a greater sense of the activities involved in how organisations 
react to modern slavery disclosure legislation. Specifically, we examine the intra- and inter-
organisational practices that have emerged in the UK HE in response to the UK Modern 
Slavery Act 2015.  Our data suggest that they engage with the legislation superficially, and 
that three main aspects of their activities explain this. Feeling unable to examine their 
supply chains in depth through resource constraints, universities have herded together to 
ensure that no single institution is left behind. Largely responsible for this is an organised 
incapacity brought about by a long-held focus on cost, which has led to purchasing consortia 
creating a barrier between universities and their suppliers, depriving universities of the 
ability to effectively manage those supply chains. This has been exacerbated by an 
atrophied accountability at Board level, meaning that insufficient time and focus is given to 
MSA by executives. The result is a widespread proforma compliance which has enabled 
universities to outperform the average reporting organisation in terms of pure compliance – 
but means that there is little depth to engagement with supply chains on labour issues and 
therefore limited behavioural change driven by that reporting. 
Our study makes three contributions. First, research on slavery is not new. For decades, 
scholars across disciplines have been exploring the topic from multiple perspectives. 
However, notwithstanding attention to the role of accounting in historical slavery (e.g. 
Irvine, 2012), the topic of “modern” slavery is new to accounting scholars and thus research 
on the topic is still at a nascent stage. We have built on this emerging literature (e.g. Christ 
et al., 2019) in a way that begins to develop the accounting discipline’s understanding of the 
processes underlying organisational activities around responses to modern slavery 
disclosure legislation. We begin a conversation on the organisational processes that inform 
what organisations publish by exploring in more depth than prior studies the inter- and 
intra-organisational practices that underpin disclosure. This enables explanations of why a 
sector with such a public mission, under scrutiny from government, has engaged so little 
with the aims of MSA, and opens up the potential for a dialogue between the accounting 
profession and the public sector, which can inform both parties’ approaches to strategically 
and practically responding to MSA in substance, rather than solely in form. 
We contribute to these discussions by identifying consistencies between the extant 
literatures and our findings and by highlighting what we add that expands our 
understanding of these studies. Parsa et al.’s (2018) suggestion that Global Reporting 
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Initiative (GRI) disclosure is used as a source of organisational legitimacy rather than a mode 
of material reporting used to drive positive change in workforce conditions extends to our 
findings on HE modern slavery disclosure. However, our findings strongly suggest that 
failure to engage in substance with MSA is not intentional on the part of HE institutions. The 
combination of a lack of internal oversight in HEIs and the paring down of the relevant 
departments have left Procurement departments unable to engage more deeply. This, in 
turn, means that the continuous improvement cycle envisaged in the law is initiated but not 
continued, preventing organisations from learning from one another.  
Such unintended organisational hypocrisy is not new in the UK HE sector (see e.g. Snelson-
Powell et al., 2019). However, with proliferating demands for reporting and disclosure on 
social management practices in the sector, the HE sector urgently needs to address its 
reporting and disclosure issues in such a way as to inspire confidence in their practices 
rather than have reporting requirements undermine efforts. Increased reliance on due 
diligence processes and more cooperation in sharing data on purchasing and supply chains 
such as those observed by Hazelton (2013) may be one way to encourage better reporting 
and disclosure and subsequent meaningful change in practice (Islam and van Staden, 2018; 
McPhail and Ferguson, 2016). 
While the collaboration we identify has not enabled HE to respond to the spirit of MSA, 
other forms of collaboration might empower them to do so. In this regard, the management 
accounting profession can play a central role. With its detailed knowledge of internal 
accounting and management control systems (Schaltegger and Csutora, 2012), and 
expertise on what constitutes appropriate levels and forms of expenditure, management 
accountants, through their formal expertise and professional experience, are well placed to 
track accounting information obtained through, for example, due diligence of tenders. Such 
due diligence could work to ensure that minimum wages were appropriately costed and 
that the design of data to be reported by suppliers conformed to accounting and disclosure 
requirements for modern slavery. It would also enable decision makers to determine 
differences between anticipated and realised data in order to identify any problems and 
ultimately drive better decision-making (Maas et al., 2016). This in turn would require a 
degree of transparency in accounting that is only possible in initiatives built on trust (Free, 
2007) and which have been aligned accounting with supply chai  strategy (Anderson, 2006). 
However, through such measures the management accounting profession stands to play a 
decisive role in rooting out modern slavery practices. 
In building on other literatures to begin accounting research on modern slavery disclosure, 
we deviate from the extant literature on organisational responses to modern slavery 
disclosure legislation (e.g. Stevenson and Cole, 2018; Voss et al., 2019). We do so by 
focusing exclusively on the practices that organisations in a specific sector adopt to respond 
to the legislation. A key assumption of the enactment of experimentalist governance – and 
therefore modern slavery disclosure legislation – is that reporting on risks and action taken 
to mitigate them will lead to improved endeavours and organisational change as outlined by 
Overdevest and Zeitlin (2012). In finding that UK universities have taken their obligations at 
face value, we introduce nuance to the position that disclosure can help to promote human 
rights (Gallhofer et al., 2011; Lauwo and Otusanya, 2014). HE has been rendered unable to 
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respond meaningfully to the legislation, meaning that it discloses little that is likely to 
uphold the rights of workers in its supply chains. 
In herding together to prevent increased scrutiny on the sector, universities have mirrored 
Stevenson and Cole’s (2018) assessment of the textile and fashion industries in which a 
homogeneity of policies precludes the customisation of approaches. This short-circuits the 
experimentalist governance process, which relies upon individual reporting before a 
rigorous peer review process and incremental, repeated implementation of best practice. 
The sector has, sometimes literally, adopted a template approach to reporting. While this 
denies stakeholders the opportunity to effectively scrutinise organisations’ approaches, it 
also impedes the ability of those universities which see themselves as taking the legislation 
seriously from gaining the competitive advantage that Cousins et al. (2017) see in those 
private sector firms that engage extensively with the Act, and which experimentalist 
governance envisages.
A significant impediment to deeper engagement with modern slavery is a lack of leadership, 
and one of the compelling factors in this is the absence of enforcement to date. The notion 
that MSA has not been prioritised because there is a perceived lack of punishment for non-
compliance confirms English’s (2019) prediction that criminal liability might be necessary 
and speaks to Feasley’s (2015) argument that The Pact worked in Brazil because it came 
with strict legal enforcement. Prokopets (2014) finds that, without this legal threat, CTSCA 
failed to deliver the expected levels of disclosure from reporting organisations.
Second, we contribute to the literature on accounting and public sector procurement, and 
in particular to HE. By introducing a specific example of how HE has responded to a law 
which grants flexibility to those in scope, we demonstrate a key outcome of the conflicting 
pressures on the sector. We shed light on the structural and leadership issues underpinning 
HE’s inability to undertake the due diligence and other supply chain action highlighted by 
Martin-Ortega and Krupinska (2018). In doing so, we show the work required of public 
sector purchasing ecosystems simultaneously expected t  deliver value and social and 
environmental sustainability, having themselves been reduced to “clerical” ‘processors’ 
(Schiele and McCue, 2006). This goes some way to demonstrating why a sector which 
spends so much appears, despite a focus on social sustainability (Walker and Phillips, 2009), 
so unable to bring that scale to bear on one of the most visible and important social ills of 
the day, modern slavery (Martin-Ortega, 2018). Issues with public sector engagement with 
modern slavery disclosure legislation are also important both because public sector 
organisations are now within scope and also because the Australian Modern Slavery Act 
2018 (2018) obliges all entities with a turnover above AUD$100m to report on modern 
slavery risks in their supply chains.
Third, we contribute to the experimentalist governance literature by suggesting some 
boundary conditions for experimentalist governance that emerged from our study. First, for 
the governance mechanisms based on experimentalist governance to work there is a need 
for all reporting entities to engage fully with their obligations in order to generate as many 
examples as possible from which the collective might later draw. Second, without the 
rigorous peer review process set out in the experimentalist governance (and envisaged in 
MSA), the continuous improvement and integration of practices cannot happen. Third, 
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although experimentalist governance is a form of self-governance, it needs monitoring and 
enforcement features embedded in them. Without this, some organisations can evade or 
free-ride. Fourth, for experimentalist governance to work, organisations need to see actual 
improvement in practices rather than reporting as their priority. This requires the element 
of competition between organisations to drive up standards. Reporting must be seen as an 
intermittent pause to reflect on their own practices and improve overall performance.
Limitations and Future Research Directions
It can be useful to consider the limitations while interpreting our study’s findings. First, 
although extant literature (e.g. Stevenson and Cole, 2018) finds similar disengagement in 
the textiles and apparel sector, our study focuses on UK HE and thus the findings may not be 
generalisable to other sectors or contexts - symptomatic of any qualitative study. The 
centrality of politics (McCrudden, 2006) and uniquely conflicting pressures PSOs are under 
(O’Brien et al., 2018) make analogy with the private sector problematic. Future research can 
explore the similarities and differences that may emerge in organisational responses to 
modern slavery disclosure legislation in other sectors and contexts. 
Second, this research comes with inherent methodological limitations. We were not able to 
engage with all universities and there were some organisations in which responsibility was 
more widely spread that one Procurement professional. Third, our study highlighted some 
boundary conditions for governance mechanisms based on experimentalist governance. 
Future studies could exclusively explore the conditions under which experimentalist 
governance can work effectively. Also, future research, using longitudinal case studies, 
could examine how and why organisational responses change over time to modern slavery 
disclosure legislation.
Practical implications
Our findings suggest that universities in the UK have not engaged deeply enough with the 
legislation to either positively impact on labour conditions or use the outputs of their supply 
chain work to demonstrate their commitment to action. The main cause is that universities 
do not have the necessary capabilities. Two reasons underpin this. First, universities have 
not previously had to deal with regulation that required deep engagement with their supply 
chains. Second, HE has outsourced much of its buying functions’ duties to purchasing 
consortia. Combined, these factors have led to the deskilling of their Procurement 
departments. While previously supply chain management has not been a priority for 
universities, the legal and reputational risks associated with MSA might undermine this 
logic. In order to engage more fully and discharge their obligations under MSA, HE 
organisations need to develop the relevant skills. They have private sector suppliers who 
have both the capabilities and experience of managing supply chains and it is likely that the 
opportunity to work more closely with a customer would be welcomed. Universities could 
learn about the processes involved in this way and magnify the benefit of this approach 
through sharing supply chain data via the consortia.
Our results also show that executives have not involved themselves in the process of 
responding to MSA, have not been sufficiently involved in decision-making on the issue, and 
have not been the critical eye required for competent governance. Our finding that many 
universities have failed to find a signatory for their statement (sometimes because nobody 
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wanted to sign the document), and that a Marketing department has prevented an 
organisation from fulfilling its legal obligations certainly adds to the lack of engagement we 
find among Boards. Modern slavery is an organisational risk gaining increasing traction in 
the media and with various stakeholder groups (LeBaron and Rühmkorf, 2019). Executives 
would do well to take the reputational aspect of that risk seriously. This involves a 
realisation that focal organisations in supply chains have influence over supplier behaviour. 
By contrast, there is also significant opportunity for leadership on the issue of modern 
slavery in supply chains. As legislation develops in the UK and elsewhere, managers will 
need to choose whether to prioritise action in this sphere immediately to take that 
opportunity, or to delay and risk the significant compound resources required to catch up.
A notable absence from our study was the lack of engagement with accounting 
professionals in preparing modern slavery disclosures. Management accountants are well 
placed to advise on the design of the data collection processes, measurement of outcomes, 
and internal reporting necessary to inform disclosure that can drive genuine, positive 
change in HE supply chains (e.g. Agndal and Nilsson, 2009; Cooper and Slagmulder, 2004). 
The use of accounting management as a lever to influence sustainability decisions is already 
understood in the literature (e.g. Arjaliès and Mundy, 2013). A specific example of this 
might be management accountants’ insights into tenders for production outsourcing. Based 
on knowledge gained through previous bids, management accountants could analyse 
tenders to ascertain the likelihood that a bid is sufficiently low, given the volume of work 
required, to raise red flags regarding potential under-payment of workers. Similarly, when 
costing contracts, management accountants could ensure that their organisations have 
taken worker pay and, where applicable, the cost of acceptable levels of accommodation 
and food (a relevant concern in many countries in the construction industry, for example 
(e.g. Becker et al., 2014) into account.
Conclusion
Modern slavery is a human tragedy and a significant organisational risk. Recent attempts to 
tackle the problem have focused on imposing obligations on organisations to disclose 
actions they are taking to drive responsible behaviour down into their supply chains. Such 
disclosure legislation, which we investigate by examining university responses to the UK 
Modern Slavery Act 2015, relies on organisational behaviours which cannot be guaranteed, 
particularly given the limited scope and sanctions imposed thereunder. We find that 
organisations have engaged to a limited extent with the Act, taking a box-ticking approach 
to compensate for the sector’s collective and individual inability to manage its supply 
chains. Yet the point of such mandatory disclosure is not to “just” report on it and then 
forget about the issue, but to drive transformative change in supply chains through 
encouraging action down the supply chain tiers. UK universities have so far been unable to 
do this, leaving them disclosing internal processes rather than reporting on and managing 
the prevalence of modern slavery in supply chains. Accounting for modern slavery has 
proven difficult across industries but establishing the kind of data-driven processes that 
steer other accounting tasks would introduce robust procedures that are currently lacking in 
HE disclosures.
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Appendix 1
Interview schedule
Question To discover
How was the process of reporting initiated? 
When, by whom, why?
Why the organization reported (at that 
exact time), who the relevant 'leaders' are.
What is the process involved in modern 
slavery reporting?  How they go about 
reporting, who is involved, what are the 
hand-offs?
What information is gathered and how, 
who does what, the decision process for 
data included/excluded is.
What is the organization's modern slavery 
strategy?
How the report is supplemented; what non-
reporting actions are being done; are there 
wider aspirations, either to lead the 
industry or go beyond that; what the org's 
future plans are.
What work has been done with the 
organization's supply chain?
How the organization has approached 
modern slavery as an issue rather than as a 
reporting necessity alone
How has the organization engaged with 
other external bodies on modern slavery?  
With whom, what are the drivers? How has 
this helped?
Mop up earlier Qs to find out the extent to 
which the org has relied on/borrowed from 
other orgs on reporting; if the org 
has engaged to enable/improve reporting 
and/or for broader supply chain action
How does the organization see itself 
compared to others? How has it 
benchmarked what it does? What’s still 
missing?
What success looks like relative to peers, 
and what has been learned from them.
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Code name Size Respondent position
University 1 Large Head of Procurement
University 2 Large Head of ProcurementProcurement Manager
University 3 Large Head of Procurement
University 4 Large Sustainability Manager
University 5 Large Head of ProcurementProcurement Manager
University 6 Large Director of Compliance
University 7 Large Procurement Director
University 8 Large Sustainability Manager
University 9 Large Head of Governance
University 10 Large Head of ProcurementHead of Assurance
University 11 Large Head of Procurement
University 12 Large Head of Procurement
University 13 Small Head of Accounts
University 14 Small Head of Procurement
University 15 Medium Procurement Manager
University 16 Small Finance Director
University 17 Large Procurement Manager
University 18 Large University Solicitor
University 19 Small Head of Procurement
University 20 Small Procurement Manager
University 21 Large Head of Procurement
University 22 Large Head of Procurement
University 23 Small Procurement Manager
University 24 Small Head of Procurement
University 25 Large Head of Procurement
University 26 Large Head of Procurement
University 27 Medium Head of Procurement
University 28 Medium Head of Procurement
University 29 Medium Head of Procurement
University 30 Large Data Protection Officer
University 31 Medium Head of Procurement
University 32 Small University Solicitor
University 33 Large Procurement Director
Table 1: interview respondents
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